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In the Arctic, the thaw of  East-West relations in the 1990s led to deeper regional and sub-regional cooperation, and a 
strengthening of  the stability of  the region through the establishment of  standards. This led in turn to the formation of  a 
patchwork of  standards that overlap and intersect: the proliferation of  soft law standards was then the only way to put the 
states and other stakeholders around the table, in a region that has not yet been cleared of  past tensions. 
Few observers would have predicted that a body which so many limitations would have reached such results in terms of  norm-
making, considering that the Arctic Council (AC) is only 20 years old. The AC has often been viewed as politically 
ineffective, with lots of  talk but little action on issues relating to its mandates of  environmental protection and sustainable 
development. The AC is very far from being a perfect forum but despite or thanks to its “soft” structure, it offers a large 
place for local voices, which ensures its legitimacy, and it can better adapt over time by facilitating compromise.  
This paper explores the central role of  the AC in Arctic norm setting, stressing the specificities of  the Council among the 
wide range of  Arctic-norm producers, and demonstrating how its successes are linked to its soft law structure, as a major 
factor of  legitimacy and socialization, and finally of  normative power in the Arctic. It is the flexibility of  the AC that 
contributes to its strength. Thus, despite the absence of  any ‘hard’ power, the AC is the major norm setting instrument in the 
Arctic.  
 
 
Introduction 
It has become a cliché to describe the changes that the Arctic region1 has being facing for thirty 
years now, both physically (Jakobsson, Ingólfsson, Long & Spielhagen, 2014), and politically 
(Stokke, 2011, 2013; Underdal, 2013; Young, 2009). The environmental challenges, economic 
changes, and geopolitical disruptions created a functional need, serving as a catalyst for the 
creation of  standards in the Arctic to prevent the struggle for economic and political worldwide 
interests. But unlike the Antarctic, there is no comprehensive legal regime governing the Arctic 
region. The thaw of  East-West relations in the 1990s, however, led to a strengthening of  regional 
and sub-regional cooperation in the Arctic, as well as increased stability of  the region through the 
development process of  dialogue and joint establishment of  standards. 
Norm production in the Arctic is still in its infancy and has not yet established a coherent body 
of  social practices for the stakeholders in the region. In fact, the profusion of  standards and the 
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variety of  norm producers is striking in the Arctic. A wide variety of  circumpolar and external 
actors in the region communicate, influence or participate in the process of  standards making. 
Different level of  stakeholders and therefore levels of  standards coexist: international standards 
that apply in the region but also national or regional standards created on different levels, in 
forums or parliaments, which explains their low binding nature in general. In the profusion of  
standards created over the last thirty years, the importance of  soft law compared to hard law is 
clear. But in this special area, could the creation of  standards be set up differently? Without going 
into the debate, we can broadly agree that soft law is soft in nature, flexible in function and free 
from strict formalities (Hasanat, 2007). That is, soft law creates non-treaty agreements – such as 
the Ottawa Declaration (1996) - while protecting states from internationally legally binding 
obligations. Soft law is therefore in many ways a facilitator of  norm-making.2 
More importantly, the establishment of  standards, even those non-binding as soft law, legitimates 
the standards producer in the Arctic – a region where symbols take up much space in the 
debates.3 This is particularly the case when the producer of  standards lacks the ability, or 
willingness, to produce hard law. The profusion of  soft law in the Arctic reflects this search for 
legitimacy - the central issue in this region - which is at the heart of  the concerns of  internal and 
external actors: states and organizations but also companies, epistemic communities, civil 
societies. Moreover, the production of  ever-increasing standards, even “soft” ones, limit the 
actors’ room for maneuver.  
The Arctic is governed by an internationally recognized regime resting on the Arctic Council 
(AC) intergovernmental cooperation and the UN Convention on the Law of  the Sea (UNCLOS). 
The AC has taken over from the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (the AEPS) (Nord, 
2015) in 1996 as a “high-level forum” (AC, 1996). The AC has no legal personality or authority to 
develop regulatory arrangements: it is only the place for Arctic countries, as well as for other 
countries aspiring to legitimacy in the region to express diplomatic and political positions. The 
AC is quite a unique cooperation model in terms of  political representation, including both 
representatives of  the eight sovereign states in the Arctic as well as six indigenous peoples’ 
organizations, who have to be “consulted” on all matters (Graczyk, 2011; Koivurova & 
Heinämäki, 2006). Other states and stakeholders such as international organizations and NGOs 
may apply as Observers. The mandate of  the AC is focused on the concept of  environmental 
protection and sustainable development as stated in the First Article of  its Establishment 
Declaration (AC, 1996). Although its agreements have no binding force, the Council is at the 
heart of  standards production in the Arctic. Yet, the Council has a lot of  limits and a low level of  
normativity. It is a place of  social practices much more than articulation of  norms, a place where 
one reduces uncertainty rather than a place where decisions are actually made, a facilitating body 
much more than a regulatory one. 
The traditional theoretical frameworks often offer explanations of  the strength of  the Arctic 
based on realistic theories of  international relations and “power politics” wherein a traditional 
concept of  power-struggle ensures the stability of  the region. As Ingrid Medby (2015) 
underlines:   
“However, adherence to the present regime of  governance is not just a matter of  
material or strategic importance for the eight Arctic states (A8). Rather, regime 
adherence in the Arctic is also a matter of  status, pride, and identity. (…)  
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Accordingly, the regime’s strength lies not so much in provisions per se, nor in any 
ability to bind and govern actors in a top-down manner, but in its discursive 
power.” 
The AC intergovernmental cooperation is very far from being a perfect forum but despite or 
thanks to its “soft” structure, it offers a large platform for local voices and can better adapt over 
time by facilitating compromise. This paper explores the central role of  the AC in Arctic norm 
setting, stressing the specificities of  the Council among the wide range of  Arctic-norm 
producers, and demonstrating how its successes are linked to its soft law structure, as a major 
factor of  legitimacy and socialization, and finally of  normative power in the Arctic. In this paper, 
we would like to stress the political and symbolic dimension of  the AC’s legal production, 
following in the footsteps of  scholars who are emphasizing the importance of  the discourse on 
normative and discursive power in the Arctic (e.g. Medby, 2015): it is the flexibility of  the AC that 
contributes to its strength. Thus, despite the absence of  any ‘hard’ power, the AC is a major 
instrument of  norm setting in the Arctic.  
The paper mainly follows the documentary analysis method, which examines the instruments of  
and documents produced under the AC, along with some international agreements formed under 
the auspices of  the AC. The study also covers a review of  existing literature, including the 
writings of  leading scholars. Finally, this paper is based on knowledge gained by (anonymously) 
interviewing members of  the AC, Working Groups of  the AC and individuals working at the 
Secretariat of  the AC in Tromsø, Norway in 2015. 
First, we will see how the AC cooperation process has reached a central place in the mosaic of  
the norm-making process in the Arctic for about thirty years, and the ways the AC builds 
standards. We will then observe the political vision that underlines the norm production in the 
Arctic, and how this is deeply linked to the soft law concept. This will allow us to see how the 
production of  standards reflects the normative influence, and finally the strength of  the AC in its 
“soft” legal structure. 
The Arctic Council at the Heart of  the Arctic Norm-Making Process 
A Multitude of  Norm-Producers in Search of  an Arctic Legitimacy  
The Westphalian approach of  sovereignty, according to which no state recognizes an authority 
beyond her own, has long prevailed in the Arctic. But it gave way over time to cooperation and 
obligation initiatives. In the twentieth century, the standards established in the region were set up 
by associations of  states in order to answer very specific questions. However, no standard on the 
general scheme of  the area of  protection was established in the Arctic during this period, while, 
the South Pole has been protected by the Antarctic Treaty since 1959: the Arctic did not seem to 
be a fertile breeding ground for international cooperation.  
However, with the thaw of  East-West relations, the Arctic experienced a sudden change in status. 
Indeed, the ‘Détente’ period of  the early 1970s was conducive to standards production between 
opposing blocks, parallel to the increased exploitation of  oil and gas in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
rise of  environmental mobilization and interest of  the epistemic community, and intensification 
of  indigenous peoples’ claims. Bilateral and multilateral gradual regional cooperation initiatives 
culminated in the Arctic in the 1980s, mainly due to growing environmental concerns which were 
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then on the world’s agenda (World Commission on Environment, 1987; Meadows, 1972). 
Today, the emerging picture of  standards in the Arctic is characterized by a patchwork of  
regulatory mechanisms, placed within a jurisdictional framework of  international law (Dodds, 
2013) thanks to the UNCLOS. There are many domestic regulations for the protection of  the 
Arctic, but there is no single comprehensive and integrated regime covering an array of  issues 
that constitute the region’s policy agenda. Most of  these plans are based on soft law, taking 
essentially preventive measures. Besides, most of  the goals remain unclear, leaving much space 
for legal interpretation (Gladun, 2015). 
As a matter of  fact, sub-state, inter-state, multi-state, trans-state, and supra-state actors interact 
with one another in a highly multilateral system of  governance. The Arctic has become a region 
whose governance is complex, and where the powers of  the bilateral and multilateral agreements, 
forums and councils, tend to overlap (Dittmer, Moisio, Ingram & Dodds 2011; Young, 2005). In 
many ways, the production of  standards in the Arctic can be celebrated as a symbol of  the 
emergence of  the Arctic as an international political region. This period is that of  region-building 
(Keskitalo, 2007: 194) where the Arctic is no longer the center of  a security paradigm but 
becomes a place of  low politics (Nilsson, 2012), where cooperation prevails and the 
establishment of  standards becomes possible. The scientific work of  the epistemic community 
(Haas, 1992) in the region is central, being an indirect standards designer. Conceptualizing the 
region through the normative and scientific work makes it possible to build and strengthen the 
legitimacy of  Arctic actors. 
The Arctic Council at the Heart of  Arctic Norm Setting  
Although it is far from the only institution of  political significance in the Arctic, the AC is the 
political pillar of  Arctic governance and pre-eminent forum in the region (Keskitalo, 2004; 
Pedersen, 2012; Dodds, 2013). The standards in the AC are established by consensus, which 
requires slow decision-making, when rapid economic and political changes sometimes call for a 
firmer approach. Moreover, the consensus seems to be established at the cost of  the eviction of  
security issues (AC, 1996). Some authors stressed the importance of  the concept of  stewardship 
(Wilson, 2016) in order to analyze the AC. From this perspective, stewardship is political, because 
it aims to ‘shape norms’ (Griffiths, 2012: 4).  
Several researchers have tried to measure the effectiveness of  the AC (Ronson, 2011; 
Kankaanpää & Young, 2012). We rather want to look at the evolution of  the way the Council is 
implementing its standards and how successful that evolution is. Primarily dedicated to the 
publication of  high-level scientific reports without real normative value, the Council has seen its 
prerogatives evolve over time. The comprehensive scientific reports of  the AC make up the most 
of  its achievements; the use of  science reports in the Council helps highlight important issues 
and places them on top of  the political agenda of  the countries of  the Arctic region, but also 
worldwide. As a soft-law body, the AC could contribute little in terms of  mitigating climate 
change. But the AC’s reports have had some influence on the international scene, and in general 
the Council has greatly contributed to the overall science of  climate change by generating high 
quality reports, drawing the attention of  researchers and politicians on certain issues, and 
highlighting the close links between the Arctic environment and the global system.4  
Few observers would have predicted that a body with so many limitations would have reached 
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such results in terms of  norm-making, at the young age of  20. The production of  scientific 
reports has undoubtedly strengthened the role of  the AC as a standards producer by bridging the 
gap between science and politics (Gladun, 2015). Research on climate change intensified through 
expert groups that have carried out an inventory of  protected natural areas, and studied 
environmental problems. International cooperation in the Arctic has indeed played a role in the 
protection of  the Arctic and the global environment by influencing at once the measures in 
response to a global pollution problem and the way national and international standards apply the 
specific conditions of  the Arctic – such as the “Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines” in 2009 
(PAME, 2009).  
In addition, the ministerial meetings of  the Council offered a discussion platform for the Arctic 
future including a wide range of  participants. The Council has enabled increased Arctic 
cooperation and influenced the coordination of  national and international policies, in order to 
become the main cooperative platform in the Arctic. Even from the perspective of  actors outside 
the region, the importance of  the AC is growing. This trend is highlighted by the recent wave of  
applicant countries and actors for observer status, such as Asian countries (Su & Lanteigne, 2015; 
Leiv Lunde, Yang & Stensdal, 2016). Levels of  interest and responsibility in the Arctic concern 
the global civil society as well as non-Arctic states and indigenous peoples organizations. Since 
the creation of  the AEPS, “Observer” states are present in regional Arctic fora. However, within 
the AC, the arrival of  six new countries in 2013 (China, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea and 
Singapore), a symbol of  the globalization of  Arctic issues, has met with strong resistance from 
some member states who feared an increased influx of  external actors and a dilution of  their 
historical authority. As regional cooperation increases and the range of  stakeholders have 
expanded worldwide (Bennett, 2014), the maintenance of  state sovereignty is a key priority for 
the Arctic states (Heininen, 2012; Knecht & Keil, 2013; Steinberg & Dodds, 2013).  
Many Shades of  Norm Making in the Arctic Council 
The AC has managed to establish treaties and standards with diverse degrees of  obligation. 
Before the launch of  its first hard law agreements, the AC published an important number of  
soft law agreement lacking formal legal rigor, yet with a certain political impact (Hough, 2013). 
But slowly policy-making is emerging from Arctic cooperation, even if  all observers point at the 
difficulty of  this development. Timo Koivurova and David VanderZwaag did a balance sheet of  
the Council’s achievements after ten years of  existence (2007: 191), in the light of  the Council’s 
limited role as a discussional and catalytic forum. The adoption of  the first legally binding 
agreements under the auspices of  the Ministerial meetings of  Nuuk (2011) and Kiruna (2013) 
changed the picture. The first agreement concerns Search and Rescue (SAR) in marine and air 
spaces (AC, 2011), the second tackles the fight against marine pollution by hydrocarbons (AC, 
2013). These texts are intergovernmental agreements negotiated and adopted within the 
framework of  this forum. 
The Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement (SAR) was the first legally-binding instrument 
negotiated and adopted under the auspices of  the AC. The agreement plans and organizes the 
conditions for sea, land and aviation rescue in the polar region, which requires a coordination of  
rescue means, including military, and cooperation among Arctic states. Its objective is to 
strengthen search and rescue cooperation and coordination in the Arctic (Rottem, 2014). As 
Anton Vasiliev – Co-Chair of  the Task Force on Search and Rescue between 2010 and 2011 – 
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explained in his article “The agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime search and 
rescue in the Arctic – A new chapter in polar law” (2013: 64), mandatory status agreements had 
been actively debated for the first three sessions before Member States decided that it should be 
legally binding and not purely political. It is a political document above all, still an opportunity for 
collaboration between Arctic coast guards and all authors and observers agree in emphasizing the 
importance of  this pioneering agreement (Koivurova & VanderZwaag, 2007; Kao, Pearre 
& Firestone, 2011; Vasiliev, 2013). In addition to being a major contribution to polar law, the 
agreement demonstrates a new level of  trust and cooperation between the Arctic states and 
illustrates their increasing ability to come to an agreement. In this sense, the SAR agreement 
paved the way for binding agreements to come in other areas where the AC could establish itself  
as the leading institution. 
A second binding agreement was set up following the work of  the EPPR in 2013: the 
“Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic”, 
which aims at promoting cooperation, coordination and assistance relating preparation and 
response in case of  oil spill leaks. The objective of  this Agreement is to strengthen cooperation, 
coordination and mutual assistance among the Parties on oil pollution preparedness and response 
in the Arctic in order to protect the marine environment from pollution by oil (Arctic Council, 
2013). It provides a mechanism for information of  the parties in case of  serious leakage and an 
obligation to provide assistance to countries that ask for advice, provision of  equipment and 
personnel. 
The signing of  these agreements is a step forward in the transformation of  the AC towards a 
more formal cooperation, and demonstrates the surprise of  many that the Council should have 
been to create a new form of  governance, with a soft law status that can adapt to emerging 
problems through legal instruments to produce effective governance. These recent significant 
advances show that even if  the Council is not an international organization, political means were 
strengthened, which many observers describe as the passage from a policy shaping to policy 
making body.  
The Strength of  Flexibility: Soft Law as a Norm-Making Facilitator 
A Short History of  Soft Law and Norm-Making in the Arctic  
Soft law has been a very controversial concept for at least four decades, parallel to its growing 
usage in international law in order to respond to new forms of  cooperation. In the case of  the 
AC, soft law created the governance regime: the AC as permanent cooperation forum was 
created thanks to a soft law process. But the provisions of  soft law instruments are legally non-
binding even though they are politically or morally binding.  
Most of  international law is characterized by low intensity and only a few international 
institutions approaching the idea of  legalizing “hard”. The hard law is associated with the ability 
to implement mechanisms capable of  imposing sanctions if  the law is not respected (Hasanat, 
2009). But in the soft law process, legalization is not completely absent. The panorama of  norms 
goes from binding rules to a simple forum for negotiations. Soft law therefore corresponds to a 
process where actors try to create standards, even if  these standards do not correspond to a 
legally binding treaty. The word “standard” therefore, covers a very fluid and flexible reality.  
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Besides, the notions of  soft law and hard law do not preclude a binary approach, but rather 
provides a gradual spectrum of  possibilities, where the cursor can be placed according to 
different variables. In this regard, one could imagine in the Arctic a spectrum of  standards that 
would range purely political statements that do not have the force of  law (such as the 
Copenhagen agreement in 2009 on climate change), to codes of  conduct, down to ministerial 
statements and formal agreements and treaties. 
It is important to observe that most legally binding international agreements formed under the 
auspices of  the AC, such as the SAR and the Oil Spill agreements are fairly open-ended and do 
not establish any strict regulation (Hasanat, 2007). Since the Council was formed by a declaration, 
it cannot operate separately from the eight Arctic states or require states to take specific 
measures: even the SAR agreement, which was celebrated as the first binding agreement signed in 
the Council, could only be set up from the goodwill of  the states. The Council’s 
recommendations in terms of  environmental protection therefore have very little chance to 
influence national governance systems. Facing climate change, the collective response of  the 
Council members was more to produce a number of  scientific reports related to the problem, 
rather than implement binding measures, while the eight Arctic countries are responsible for 
almost half  of  global greenhouse gas emissions, and the Arctic region is surely one of  the most 
visibly affected by the problem.  
Nevertheless, with no decision-making abilities, but only ‘soft’ power, concerns have been raised 
that the AC remains a weak institution, severely lacking power to influence national governments 
(Heininen & Nicol, 2007; Koivurova, 2010; Koivurova & VanderZwaag, 2007; Young, 2012). The 
AC structure of  soft law makes it unable to take formal decisions that would be legally binding 
for Member States in order to react to the climate urgency in the Arctic. The AC is in thus far 
more a decision shaper than a decision maker (Hasanat, 2009). The Council has also not been 
conceived as an operational tool, and while many guidelines are produced by the Working 
Groups of  the Council, the impacts of  these are difficult to determine, since the Council has no 
mechanisms to assess the monitoring of  the recommendations. As such, the AC has been 
repeatedly criticized (see e.g. Huebert & Yeager, 2008; Koivurova, 2010; Koivurova & Molenaar, 
2010). Only the signatory states are able to implement the standards and there is no sanction for 
non-compliance, which begs the question of  the norm implementation (Dingman, 2015). The 
AC does not and cannot enforce and implement guidelines, assessments or recommendations: 
that responsibility belongs to each Arctic individual state.  
In the current discussion about the form that standards should take in the Arctic, most of  the 
reform proposals recommend a formal legal instrument (Pharand, 1991; Koivurova, 2000; 
Hasanat, 2013). The European Parliament had thus proposed the creation of  an Arctic Treaty in 
2008, which was an anathema to the circumpolar governments. On the contrary, Oran Young 
supports the development of  arrangements on specific topics (Young 2009; Young, 2011: 331), 
which appears to be the most pragmatic solution, as establishing hard law standards does not 
seem to be politically feasible. The British researcher and diplomat Alyson Bailes stressed, “trying 
to force it [the AC] into a “stronger” mould (…) would most likely undermine these positive 
qualities while guaranteeing no useful results” (2013: 17). 
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The strong sides of  soft-law 
Soft law is often viewed as a step in the development of  the standard that would evolve in time 
into hard law. On the contrary, our approach considers soft law as a particularly effective method 
to implement standards. It is the “soft” structure that allows the legalization of  social cohesion, 
in particular by including a wide variety of  players at the heart of  negotiations. The main 
advantage to establish a framework for international governance without a harder structure is that 
it offers more room to include non-state actors. In particular, local voices need to be included in 
the governance process. Those bottom-up initiatives bring the additional legitimacy, expertise, 
and other resources required for making and enforcing new norms and standards, and provide an 
effective means for direct civil society participation in global governance. Because of  its soft law 
structure, the AC can’t develop regulatory arrangements but includes indigenous peoples in the 
cooperation process. 
Soft law is a product of  state practice when conducting an international treaty is not possible at 
all. The actors can then have confidence in the agreement and know that it will not be used to 
impose policies with which they disagree, and they are assured that there will be no limitation in 
their ability to act in their national interest. Soft law provides much more ways to manage 
uncertainty, and can better adapt over time by facilitating compromise and mutual effects of  the 
cooperation between the different values and interests of  the actors, with different degrees of  
power and different time scales. In this perspective, Ingrid Medby stresses the importance of  the 
normative influence of  the AC: the AC does not conduct state’s political practices, since it has no 
binding power. Nonetheless, the AC lead the Arctic stakeholders to conduct themselves in certain 
ways: “The major successes of  the AC may be the sheer interaction of  states and other actors on 
an equal playing-field; in particular states whose officials are otherwise prone to bilateral dialogue-
aversion.” (2015: 331). Although it holds no hard power to force the states in the region to any 
behavior, the AC is a powerful instrument to oblige them politically by setting soft-law norms.  
It is a complex balance to achieve for the AC, between efficiency, that is promoting “harder” 
agreements, and legitimacy, that is offering a larger place for locals in the decision process. The 
AC is not a perfect forum, but despite, or perhaps thanks to its internal limitations, the AC has 
scored a lot of  successes, primarily by placing non-state actors at the heart of  the negotiations. 
The AC binds players just a bit, thus it binds them together. It is this ability to bend without 
breaking, this strength of  the flexibility that seems particularly valuable in the operation of  the 
AC.  
Conclusion 
The key to the success of  the Council lies in its generative role. Over the years the AC’s 
intergovernmental cooperation has built a foundation of  shared norms and values, and it has 
significantly increased the level of  socialization and interaction between the Arctic states, even for 
the most reluctant to cooperate.  
For some authors, the soft law nature and restricted mandates of  the AC have limited its capacity 
to respond to new issues emerging from climate change, particularly those related to the 
exploitation of  oil and gas reserves, commercial shipping through the region, effects on wildlife, 
and impacts on indigenous peoples’ homelands and culture. (see e.g. Kao, Pearre & Firestone, 
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2011). In the face of  the criticism often directed at soft law, it must be repeated that it is always 
preferable to a total lack of  cooperation structure or even control, and one wonders what such a 
fragile region as the Arctic would look like if  it were delivered to the national interests of  power 
politics. 
The British researcher and diplomat Alyson Bailes rightly stressed the importance of  not 
criticizing the AC by comparing it to an ideal type (2013). For her, it is unfair to evaluate the AC’s 
strengths and weaknesses by the standards of  institutions of  fundamentally different types – for 
instance by comparison with the Antarctic regime, when it resembles more closely the sub-
regional organizations of  Europe. By their standards, the AC has no unusual major weaknesses, 
and it shares all their typical strengths, which are especially relevant for handling the Arctic in a 
time of  rapid evolution and architectural ambiguity.  
Despite its many imperfections in the norm-making process, the AC is the source of  many 
successes: the first indigenous participation in the cooperation process, or the interactions 
between politics and science that produced innovative and influential research reports. The 
Council played a pioneering role in the field of  environmental protection against organic 
pollutants, and by analyzing the consequences of  climate change in particular. But non-binding 
standards do not imply a much less robust system. The AC is not based on hard-law standards 
and agreements but it has built a foundation of  shared norms and values. Regional standards 
around environmental protection and the inclusion and respect of  local and indigenous 
perspectives have been institutionalized in the AC and beyond. For us it is the flexibility of  the 
current system of  emerging standards that contributes to its robustness. 
Yet, the Council is a place of  social practices much more than articulation of  norms, a place 
where one reduces uncertainty and not where the decisions are made, a facilitating body much 
more than a regulatory one. But facilitating cooperation, social practices and thus the 
establishment of  standards, is already a lot especially in the Arctic. The strength of  the AC is to 
have managed to remain flexible with its flexible structure and organization of  soft law, which 
could be a visionary and promising medium to cooperate in the global field of  environment, 
given the relative failure of  current environmental international negotiations. Ironically, the AC’s 
greatest weaknesses are also its greatest strengths.  
 
Notes 
1. The Arctic is a region with a large number of  definitions. In this paper, we will use the 
AC’s reliance on the Arctic Circle’s latitude (66° 33’ north) the most widely accepted 
definition, where the eight states with territories north thereof  are recognized as Arctic 
states: Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the 
United States. 
2. We are aware that the dichotomy of  soft/hard law is challenged by some legal experts 
(Trubek et al., 2006). Without going into the details of  these discussions, we consider 
these concepts as useful tools in our demonstration.  
3. The high-profile event of  the Russian flag planted in 2007 in the Arctic Ocean has 
essentially a symbolic value, but reminds the international community the submissions in 
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the CLCS and then demarcation negotiations over areas where these coastal states have 
fairly limited rights. Canada has made similar statements, although more discreet for the 
Northwest Passage. 
4. While the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had already noted in 2001 
that the effects of  climate change tended to be more noticeable in the Arctic is the ACIA 
that sets up the flagship of  Arctic as a witness of  global warming, as that region is 
warming twice as fast as the rest of  the world. In addition, an important element that the 
ACIA has highlighted in a new way is the impact of  climate change on Arctic inhabitants, 
particularly on indigenous peoples. This report illustrates the scientific cooperation at the 
highest level, given the number of  scientists involved, from eleven countries. 
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